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Brian Balzer and Kyle Stiegert
On June  1, 1998, President Clinton approved  a three-year quota on wheat  gluten imports from Australia,
the European Union, and  all other nonexcluded  countries. The quota-remedy  will be reviewed for possible
extension for up to five additional  years. The potential for extensions is an important reason to develop a
better economic understanding  of this industry and the effectiveness  of the implemented  quotas. The
purpose of this paper is to provide background  on the gluten trade dispute, to decipher the qualitative
impacts of EU policies on world gluten markets, and to evaluate  the potential effectiveness  of the U.S.
quota remedy. The U.S. industry has operated  at a low level of capacity utilization, implying high elasticity
of supply; demand  is inelastic;  and Canada, a major producer and exporter of gluten, was excluded  from the
quota. These factors are likely to significantly limit the quota's effectiveness  but may give the industry time
to develop value-added  products that use their primary outputs.
Introduction  the cost of production. The U.S. Trade Representa-
tive-Designate  Charlene  Barshefsky  initiated  the
From  1983  through  1995,  U.S.  imports  of  Section  301  investigation  on  "certain  subsidies  of
wheat  gluten  from  the  European  Union  (EU)  in-  the  European  Union  that  are  adversely  affecting
creased  at a 47 percent annual  rate (Figure  1).  The  U.S. modified  starch exports  to Europe."  However,
market effects from these increased imports helped  for a  number of legal and political  reasons,  the in-
to contribute  to declines in U.S. capacity  utilization  vestigation  ended, and the United  States chose  not
(below 50 percent  in  1997), decreased  profitability  to seek damages under Section 301.
of  U.S.  firms,  and  lower  imports  from  other  na-  The  WGIC  then  pursued  sanctions  against
tions.  In  early  1997,  the  Wheat  Gluten  Industry  the European Union under Section 201 law. Under
Council  (WGIC)1 pursued  actions  against  the EU  Section  201, domestic  industries  seriously injured
under Section  301  of the  1974  Trade  Act.2 Their  or threatened  with serious injury by increased  im-
principal  claim  was  that EU Common  Agriculture  ports  may  petition  the  U.S.  International  Trade
Policies  (CAP)  were  enabling  European  starch  Commission  (USITC)  for import  relief.  The  test
processors  to profitably export a starch co-product,  of injury to  an industry  is  less complicated politi-
wheat  gluten, to the  United  States  at prices  below  cally  and  perhaps  easier  to  prove  than  a  Section
301,  which  involves  a comprehensive  interpreta-
Balzer  and  Stiegert  are graduate  assistant  and  assistant  pro-  tion of U.S.  interests  with  its trade  partners.  The
fessor  at  Kansas  State  University,  respectively.  Funding  for  USITC  completed  its  inquiry  in  January  of  1998
this  project  was  graciously  provided  through  The  Wheat  and found  (by a 3-0 vote) that the industry  claims
Utilization Committee of U.S.  Wheat Associates,  which con- 
sists  of representatives  from several  state and national  wheat  were  deed valid  They provided to the President
commissions  and  marketing  boards.  Appreciation  is  ex-  a quota-remedy policy opinion (USITC,  1998b).
pressed  to  KSU Wheat  Research  Center for council  and  ad-  Responding  to  the  USITC  opinion  report,
vice  during this project. The authors  are listed  alphabetically;  President  Clinton,  on  June  1,  1998,  approved  a
senior authorship  is not assigned. Contribution  No. 99-117-J  three-year  quota  on  wheat  gluten  imports  from
from the Kansas Agricultural  Experiment Station.n  o  o
Australia, the European  Union,  and all  other non-
The WGIC  is  a group  comprised  primarily  of two  starch  excluded  countries.  The  excluded  countries  were
gluten  processors-Midwest  Grain  Products,  Inc.,  Atchison,  Canada; Mexico;  Israel;  beneficiary  countries  un-
KS,  and  Manildra  Milling  Corporation,  Shawnee  Mission,  der the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act, or the An-
KS.  Manildra  Milling  Corporation  is  a  subsidiary  to  the  n  r  r  rn  n
Manildra  Group  of  Australia,  which  also  owns  gluten-  Preference  Act; and  developing coun-
processing capacity  in its home  country.  Archer Daniel  Mid-  tries that  have not exported  gluten.  Canada is  the
lands  and  Heartland  Wheat  Growers  also  own  gluten-proc-  only excluded  country  with significant  exports  of
essing facilities in the United States.  gluten to  world  markets.  The quota went  into  ef-
2Section  301  permits  the  U.S.  Trade  Representative  to  in-  fect immediately,  and it limits gluten imports from
vestigate  and  sanction  countries  whose  trade  practices  are  all nonexcluded countries in the first  12 months to
deemed "unfair" to U.S.  interests.  126.8 million pounds.  The quota limits imports to2  July 1999  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
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62.425  million  pounds  from  Australia,  54.041  milling process  also produces  about  3 pounds  of
million  pounds  from  the  European  Union,  and  wheat  starch.  After drying,  the gluten is marketed
10.346  million  pounds  from  the  "other"  country  as a free-flowing  powder. Powdered  wheat  gluten
categories (USTR,  1998).  The quota will increase  rapidly  absorbs  water  to  approximately  twice  its
6  percent  annually  for  the  duration  of the  three-  original  weight,  which  restores  its intrinsic  func-
year  relief period.  The  quota-remedy  will  be  re-  tionality  (MGPI,  1997b).  Gluten  is  a  term  that
viewed for possible extension  for up to five addi-  describes  two  groups of wheat protein  in the  glu-
tional  years.  The  potential  for  extensions  is  an  ten complex-gliadins  and glutenins (Stiegert  and
important  reason  to  develop  a  better  economic  Blanc,  1997).  Combined,  these  proteins  give
understanding  of this  industry  and  the  effective-  bread dough  its properties  of strength  and  elastic-
ness of  the  implemented  quotas.  The  purpose  of  ity.  The  starch  output  can  be  used as  food  addi-
this paper is to  provide background  on the  gluten  tives, further processed into value-added products,
trade  dispute,  to  decipher  the  qualitative  impacts  or used as feedstock for ethanol production.
of EU policies  on world gluten  markets,  to evalu-  Gluten  typically  is  added  to  specialty  bread
ate  the  potential  effectiveness  of  the  U.S.  quota  products  because  formulas  using  whole  wheat  or
remedy,  and to outline possible future research.  other ingredients need  a stronger protein complex
to  maintain  strength  and  elasticity  in  the  mixing
Economics  of Wheat Gluten  and baking process  (MGPI,  1997a).  The strength-
ening  characteristics  provided  by  wheat  gluten Commercial  wheat  gluten  is  obtained  by  also  improve  machinability  in  the  high-speed
separation  of wheat  flour  into  starch  and  gluten  bread  production  processes.  Wheat  inherently
through  the  wet-milling  process.  Wheat gluten  is  contains  most  of the  proteins  needed  for baking
produced in  fixed proportion  to wheat starch.  For  many bread-type products.  However, in crop years
every  pound  of wheat  gluten  produced,  the  wet-  when  intrinsic  wheat  protein  is  low,  vital  wheatBalzer, Brian, and Kyle Stiegert  The EU-U.S. Wheat Gluten Policy Dispute  3
gluten  will  be  added  to  high-volume  pan  bread  baked  products  give  wheat  gluten  its  market
and hard  roll flours  to raise the protein content to  value. Thus, the economic  impact associated  with
a  desired level.  Thus,  wheat gluten  is  a substitute  the EU-U.S.  trade dispute involves  more than the
for the inherent  protein  in  wheat  kernels.  Ortalo-  simple injury claims of the starch-gluten industry.
Magne  and  Goodwin  (1992)  showed  that demand  Distorted  gluten  markets  may  be  responsible  for
for wheat  gluten  is positively  related  to  the price  lowering  protein  premiums,  which  would  nega-
of high protein  wheat.  tively  impact  the  returns  to  wheat  breeding  pro-
Because  of  the  important  role  that  protein  grams,  producers,  and owners  of storage  facilities
content  has  in  determining  hard  wheat  quality,  in many regions of the world.
hard  wheat  is  marketed  globally  based  on  con-  The  trend  in  U.S.  gluten  imports  from  1983
tracted  protein  minimums.  Milling  and Baking  through  1996  is  presented  in  Figure  2  by  major
News reports  a protein premium  schedule  for  in-  suppliers.  Although  the  imports  sourced  from  the
trinsic  protein  levels  between  11  percent  and  14  European  Union and Australia both  have increased
percent  at  0.2  percent  increments.  Parcell  and  over time, imports  from the European  Union  have
Stiegert  (1998)  summarized  the  findings  from  been  increasing  at a  much faster rate.  Canada  and
nine different  studies  that estimated  the  marginal  other countries have generally  kept gluten  imports
value  of  wheat  quality  characteristics  in  world  constant  over time.  In  the quota-restricted  market,
markets.  Protein consistently  emerged as the most  it is completely  feasible for Canada to increase  ex-
important  quality  characteristic  in  shaping  the  ports  to  the  United  States.  In  fact,  the  more  suc-
quality-based pricing profile of wheat.  cessful  the quota is in driving a wedge between the
world price  and  the  U.S.  price,  the  more  Canada
U.S.  Gluten Imports and Economic Impacts  will  take  advantage  of  its  exclusionary  status.
Later,  we  discuss  the  policy  structure  in  Canada
The  relative  scarcity  of  high  protein  wheat  and Canada's  ability  to.expand  production  and  to
and the demand for protein for many high-volume  capitalize  on the U.S. gluten quota.
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The market share of U.S. gluten  imports is pre-  dustry caused by  gluten imports. Several key  fac-
sented in Figure 3 by major supplier. Only the Euro-  tors  generally  supported  this  claim  (USITC,
pean  Union  increased  its  U.S.  market  share  during  1998a).  Increased  imports  of gluten to the  United
the  1980s  and  1990s.  Even though Australia  was a  States  displaced  potential  U.S.  production.  In
dominant  exporter  of wheat gluten  into  the United  1993,  the  industry  operated  at  78  percent  of ca-
States,  they  lost  about  one-third  of  their  market  pacity.  By  1996,  annual  capacity  utilization  had
share. These trends  are particularly  observable  from  decreased  to  42  percent  of capacity,  and  it  in-
Figures 4 and 5,  which break down the import mar-  creased  only  slightly  to  44  percent  in  1997.  In-
ket in  1985  and in  1996, respectively.  In  1985,  the  ventories  more  than  tripled  from  1993  through
European  Union  maintained  a  2  percent  market  1995,  from  4.5  million  pounds  to  13.8  million
share, but this  increased to nearly 50 percent of the  pounds.  After  1995,  inventories  remained  exces-
import  market  in  1996.  Australia's  market  share  sively  high  by  historical  standards-11.5  million
dropped  from  59  percent  to  38  percent,  and  Can-  pounds  in  1996  and  9.1  million  pounds  in  1997.
ada's dropped from 28 percent to 9 percent.  The  ratio  of EU  imports  to  U.S.  production  rose
The section  201  investigation  by  the USITC  from  34  percent in  1993  to  almost  75  percent  in
focused  on the claim of injury to the domestic  in-  1997.
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Figure 4. U.S.  Gluten Imports, 1985.  Figure 5. U.S.  Gluten Imports, 1996.
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On  the  flip  side,  excess  capacity  also  oc-  capacity.  U.S.  capacity  increased  28  percent  in
curred because U.S.  firms added new capacity in  1994 and 22 percent in 1995.
the  mid-1990s.3 U.S.  plant  capacity  grew  from
162.856  million pounds in  1993  to 273.895  mil-  EU Policies
lion  pounds  in  1997  (USITC,  1998a).  This  un-
derutilized  source  of gluten  processing  poses  a  Starch-gluten  processing  involves  a  simple
serious  threat to the  success of a quota designed  technology commonly applied in many regions of
to raise gluten prices above the world price. One  the world. As  a result, major technological,  logis-
motive for the recent additions  in capacity  came  tical, or managerial  forms  of comparative  advan-
from  the  U.S.  ethanol  sector policies.  The U.S.  tages  do not exist across nations  in this industry.
Congress  had  mandated  pollution  reductions  on  In this section, we discuss the EU policy structure
large  American  cities  by  requiring  minimum  for the cornstarch and wheat starch markets.
oxygenated  fuel  (that  is,  ethanol)  requirements  As  we  will  see,  substantive  evidence  ties
by the  mid-1990s.  The  added  demand  for etha-  excess  supplies  of wheat  gluten  to  policies that
nol  encouraged  new  construction  of ethanol  ca-  protect  EU cornstarch  and wheat starch  markets.
pacity.4 However,  after the 1994 election and the  However, the policy structure is far from easy to
subsequent  shift  in  control  of  congress  to  the  understand.  Most  of  the  complexities  involve
Republicans,  the  mandate  was  removed.  This  wheat  starch  and  cornstarch  policies,  substitut-
unanticipated  shock  in the  ethanol  market  low-  ability  of  wheat  starch  and  cornstarch  in  the
ered  returns  to  wheat  starch  production,  which  marketplace,  and  the  subsequent  effect  on  EU
exasperated  the  excess  capacity  problem  in the  output of a wheat starch-gluten joint product.
starch-gluten industry.
The  investigation  also took into account  fi-  Wheat Starch
nancial  information  of  individual  gluten-  Although  we  do  not  have  a  time  series  of
processing  firms  in  the  United  States.  This  fi-  EU  starch  tariff  levels,  periodic  and  anecdotal
nancial  data  was  suppressed  in  the  public  ver-  information  suggests  that  the  industry  has  been
sion  of  the  report.  However,  verbiage  in  the  provided  considerable  support  and  protection
public report indicates a strong response in favor  from outside  competition.  In  1995,  for  example,
of the  industry.  Regarding  operations  on  wheat  the European  Union  maintained an  average tariff
gluten;  "There  was  a  sharp  increase  in  profit-  of  $435/ton  on  imported  wheat  starch  (MGPI,
ability between  1993  and  1994,  then a sharp  de-  1997b). The average prices of native wheat starch
dine  in  profitability  in  1995,  and  further  de-  were $242 per metric ton in the United States and
dines  which  resulted  in  losses  in  1996  and  $529 per metric ton in the European  Union. With
1997" (USITC,  1998a).  In response to questions  the  lare  starch  tariff  in  place,  imported  wheat
about  whether  profitability  of starch  operations  starch was kept out of the European Community.
should  be included  in the  analysis,  WGIC's po-  It  appears  that  starch-gluten  processors  in
sition  was  one  of  indifference:  "you've  got  a  the  European  Union  earn  profit  in  a  protected
very  severely  declining  performance  trend,  re-  starch  market. Because gluten  is a co-product  in
gardless of how you look at it."  (USITC,  1998a)  the  production  process,  incentives  to  produce
Thus,  the WGIC  apparently  presented  evidence  th  p  c  p  e  i  to  prouc Thus,  the WGIC  apparently  presented  evidence  excess  starch  imply  that  excess  gluten  will  be
that  clearly  related  the  excess  imports  of  EU  produced as well. This overproduction  drives the
gluten  to  decreased  capacity  utilization,  in-  world  market  price  for  gluten  lower.  Because
creased  inventories,  lost market  share,  and  ac-  starch-gluten  producers  in  other  regions  of the
counting losses. The timing of accounting  losses  world  do not  enjoy as  much  tariff protection  as
correlated also with increases in U.S.  production  EU  producers  do,  their  total  per  unit  revenue
from starch  and  gluten  could easily  end  up be-
3  New  wheat  starch-gluten  facilities  began  operations  in  low their cost of production.
two  locations.  Midwest  Grain  opened  a  plant  in  Pekin,  The  USITC (1998a)  reported that  the  U.S.
Illinois,  and  a  cooperative  plant  was  opened  in  Russell,  import tariff rate on wheat starch was $0.004 per
-Kansas.  pound in  1997  (USITC,  1998a).  The EU  wheat
4 The Pekin,  Illinois, wheat gluten  plant operated  by Mid-  starch  import  tariff,  converted  to  U.S.  dollars,
west Grain is fitted to process  wheat starch into ethanol.  was  $0.106 per pound, or about 26 times higher6  July 1999  Journal  of Food Distribution  Research
than the U.S. tariff. To put this in a different per-  export  subsidy  paid  to  producers  varies,  de-
spective,  the world price  of starch  is typically  at  pending  on the  spread  in  starch  prices  between
about  the  same  level  as  the  EU tariff  on  wheat  Europe  and the world.  This policy,  like  the oth-
starch  (that  is,  0.11  per pound).  This  tariff dif-  ers,  maintains  the  European  Union's  domestic
ferential  between  the two countries  helps  to ex-  starch  price  above  the  world  price.  Domestic
plain why the price for wheat  starch in the Euro-  producers  gain  from  the  export  subsidy  and
pean Union has been, at times, 2 1/2 times greater  domestic  consumers  lose.  Again,  this  subsidy
than the world price,  domestic  consumers  lose.  Again,  this  subsidy than the world price.  increases  production  of both  wheat  starch  and
Cornstarch  gluten.
The  European Union  maintains  import tar-  Who's Right?
iffs  on  cornstarch  that  also  raise  their  internal
price well  above  the  world price. Without  corn-  The  European  Union  maintains  that,  rela-
starch  tariffs,  many EU  food  processors  would  tive  to  the rest of the  world,  its  policies  do  not
substitute  cornstarch  for  high-priced  wheat  provide  an  unfair  advantage  to  its  processors.
starch  in their formulas whenever possible.  They  have  explained  that  subsidies  for  wheat
In a free  market,  cornstarch  maintains  sev-  starch  are designed only  to reimburse its proces-
eral  cost  and  processing  advantages  over  the  sors  for  CAP  programs  that  raise  the  price  of
production of wheat starch. The most obvious is  wheat above  world  markets. True,  the EU price
that corn  is  cheaper  than  wheat  on  world  mar-  of wheat has been above the world price for over
kets. Corn also is processed into a single fraction  a decade as  a result of CAP policies. Essentially,
of  starch.  Wheat  yields  two  starch  fractions,  the claim  is that the EU  marketing  margin  (that
which  require  added  costs  to  separate.  In  the  is,  the  co-product  revenue  from  processing  a
European  Union,  two  major  trends  have  been  specific  quantity  of wheat  less  the  cost  of that
noteworthy;  first,  corn-processing  plants  have  wheat)  is  about  the  same  as  that  in  any  other
been  retrofitted  to  process  wheat  (MGPI,  country.
1997b),  and  second,  new  wheat-processing  If marketing margins  for EU and U.S. proc-
plants  have  been  constructed  (USITC,  1998a).  essors  are  about the  same,  then  in a  free  global
Under the current EU policy structure, therefore,  market,  industry  expansion  rates  and  capacity
wheat processing  appears  to  be sufficiently pro-  utilization  rates  should  be  similar as  well.  Such
tected  such  that  it  is  favored  relative  to  either  has  not  been  the  case  in  recent  years.  Wheat
extracting or importing cornstarch.  gluten  processing  in  the  European  Union  has
expanded  through  retrofitting  of corn  wet  mill-
Nonfood Starch Subsidy  ing  plants  and  new  plant  investments . There-
fore,  logic  dictates  that  marketing  margins  are
Starch  refunds  also  increase  gluten  and  more  profitable  for  EU  wheat  processors  than
starch  production  by  providing  government  they  are  for  EU  corn  processors.  Two  possible
payments  to  European  industrial  (that  is,  non-  conclusions  subsequently  arise.  One,  EU  poli-
food)  users  of wheat  starch.  The  nonfood  sub-  cies  in  the  corn  sector  place  that  industry  at  a
sidy is meant to compensate producers  of indus-  comparative  disadvantage  with  the  rest  of  the
trial products  for the difference  between  the EU  world  (ROW),  and  the  European  Union  claims
price of starch  and the world  market price.  This  that its  wheat processors  are  no more profitable
nonfood  starch  subsidy causes  an  outward  shift  than those in the ROW are indeed possible. Sec-
in the demand curve for starch  and increases  EU  ond, if policies controlling the corn sector do not
starch  prices.  This  greater  demand  for  starch  place  corn  processors  at  a  comparative  disad-
increases  production  for starch,  which,  in  turn,  vantage  with  the ROW,  then  its  wheat  policies
increases gluten production.
Starch Export Subsidy  5  The  Tate and Lyle  1994 Annual Report states:  "Reforms
to  the European  Common  Agricultural  Policy  are . . . in-
creasing  price  discrepancies  between  maize  and  wheat. The European  Union  pays  export  subsidies  [Tate  and  Lyle]  is  consequently  investing  to  increase  its
for wheat  starch and  cornstarch.  The  amount of  wheat processing considerably at the expense of maize."Balzer, Brian, and Kyle Stiegert  The EU-U.S. Wheat Gluten Policy Dispute  7
must  be  strategically  benefiting  the  wheat-  tively  elastic,  quantity  changes  do  not  cause
processing sector relative to the ROW.  much  price  movement.  The  same  effects  on
Capacity utilization  rates  point to  the latter  world  price  would  be  observed  if the  EU  poli-
hypothesis. In  the United  States,  wheat  process-  cies  simply  led  to  displaced  imports  into  their
ing capacity  utilization  rates  dropped  below  50  own  region. The  reason  is  that  importers  tradi-
percent  in  1996  and  1997.  For  the  20  wheat  tionally  supplying  the  European  Union  would
starch-gluten  firms  in  the  European  Union,  ca-  now  have  extra  supplies  on  the  world  market,
pacity utilization  remained  above  91  percent  in  which also would lower prices.
most years  from  1993  through  1997,  except  in  Only  one  economic  analysis  of the  world
1995  when  utilization  dropped  to  87.8  percent  gluten  market  has  been  conducted.  Ortalo-
(USITC,  1998a).6 So,  without  even  a  detailed  Magne  and Goodwin  (1992) used  a  U.S.  struc-
analysis of the policy framework,  anecdotal  evi-  tural  import demand  model to  estimate  the de-
dence  suggests  that  EU  wheat  processors  are  mand  elasticity  of  gluten.  They  showed  the
benefiting from EU policies relative to the ROW  long-run  demand  elasticity for  wheat  gluten  to
wheat processors.  This  can  be  the  only  way  to  be -0.69, which implies that the market is price-
explain  retrofitting  activities,  new  plant  invest-  inelastic. However,  their study covered  a period
ment, and low capacity utilization in the ROW.7 of time  (1974-1988)  when  gluten  prices  were
Because of the fixed proportional  nature  of  fairly  stable  and  EU  starch  policies  were  in
starch-gluten  processing,  firms  that  maximize  their  beginning  stages.  Therefore,  the  policy-
joint-product  profits  will  produce  more  of both  induced  supply  increases  since  then  may  have
products  when  only  one  is  subsidized.  In  fact,  lowered  the world  gluten  price such  that firms
fixed proportion technology  implies directly  that  selling  starch  in  unprotected  markets  cannot
the  chosen  output  level  is  not  dependent  on  turn a profit and shut down plants.
which  product  is  subsidized  or  whether  both
products  are  subsidized.  The  only  critical  com-  Support for U.S.  Wheat Gluten Industry
ponents  of  the  decision  are  the  joint  product
revenues  per volume  of material  processed  and  During the  January  1998  ITC hearings,  the
the  associated  material  and  processing  costs.  U.S.  baking industry  testified in favor of WGIC
Simply put, subsidies  in wheat starch will  cause  claims  (Frey,  1998).8 Why  would  the U.S.  bak
firms to increase outputs of both products.  ing industry be in favor of import restrictions  on
Assuming that EU starch policies have gen-  wheat  gluten,  which  would  increase  their input
erated  added supplies  of gluten,  one of the most  costs?  Gluten  is not  a  high-cost  component  for
important questions  facing U.S. policymakers  is  bakers;  therefore,  paying  more  may  not  be  of
simply,  "What is the demand elasticity of wheat  great  importance  to  this  industry.  What  is  per-
gluten?". If it is inelastic, then increased supplies  haps the greatest threat is lack of supply control.
tend  to  reduce  price  appreciably.  If  it  is  rela-  Ideally,  a buyer prefers  not to  rely  strictly  on  a
small group of distant suppliers for a critical in-
put.  It  is  in  the  buyer's  best  interest  to  have
6 The 1995  drop in utilization occurred during a single year  many  suppliers  from  different  regions  of  the
when there was a 23  percent increase in total capacity.  It is
common  to  understate  capacity  utilization  in  years  when  Australian  wheat  tarch-
capacity  has been  added.  New  capacity  is  not typically  in  gluten industries  were forced  to shut down com-
production  at the start of the accounting year,  but it will be  pletely, U.S. bakeries would become  much more
added to the aggregate  capacity for the industry. Also, new  dependent on Europe, which could exercise  near
capacity often takes time to be brought to  full production  monopoly power in setting prices. In sum, a reli- monopoly power in setting prices. In  sum, a reli-
7 The  European  Union  also  claimed  that  U.S.  corn  target  able  long-run  supply  of competitively  produced
price programs  drive  down  the  price  of corn  and  make  it  gluten is more important to U.S.  bakers than are
difficult  for U.S.  wheat starch-gluten  processors  to profita-  the  short-term  benefits  associated  with  subsidy-
bly compete  in  markets  where  cornstarch  is  a  strong  sub-  enhanced gluten prices
stitute.  The U.S.  corn  target  price programs  encourage  in-
creased corn production  and lower the world  price  for corn
and cornstarch.  However, without CAP policies designed  to  Charles  Sullivan,  Chairman  of  Interstate  Bakeries,  and
raise  corn  and  cornstarch  prices  above  world  levels,  EU  Paul Abenante, President of American  Bakers  Association,
wheat  starch-gluten  processors  would  be  facing  equally  spoke in support of the wheat gluten petition TA-201-67  on
stiff competition  from cornstarch  processors.  December  16,  1997  (USITC,  1998a).8  July 1999  Journal  of Food Distribution  Research
Assessment  of the U.S. Policy Move  gluten demand, will hold the price at a level that
is not much higher than the world price.
U.S.  agricultural  trade  disputes  with  the
European  Union have become  some  of the  most  Increases in Canadian  Imports
common  and  important  issues  in  international
trade  negotiations.  These  disputes  are  diverse  U.S. wheat gluten imports from Canada likely
and  include  topics  such  as  import  protection,  will  increase  during the  next  three years.  Canada
export  subsidies,  and  a  variety  of food  safety  maintains  a  prohibitive  tariff-rate  quota  on  non-
issues.  In  the  midst  of these  major  confronta-  NAFTA  wheat  product  imports. ° 1 As  a  result,
tions,  the Clinton  Administration  put into place  wheat  gluten  imports  from  non-NAFTA  regions
an import quota affecting a relatively tiny part of  into  Canada  are  not  expected  to  increase.  How-
the  agricultural  processing  sector.  The  quota  is  ever, a new wheat gluten processing plant recently
designed  to  reduce  gluten  imports  by  about  50  opened  in Alberta  (API Grain Processors-capac-
million pounds in the first year. Very clearly, the  ity of  13.5  million  pounds  gluten),  and  a  second
WGIC's  legal  position  in  this  case  was  sound.  plant  in Thunder  Bay, which  was  closed  in  1996
Its  claim of material  injury  to  the  starch-gluten  and 1997,  has been renovated and re-opened (Riv-
industry  as  a result  of EU  policies  is  basically  erside  Grain-capacity  of  13.6  million  pounds)
accurate.  The  Clinton  Administration  acted  in  (USITC,  1998a).  The  combination  of  these  two
good faith  in responding to  the concerns  of this  plants  will  provide  Canada  with  enough  excess
industry. In fact, the  specific nature of the  quota  gluten  to  replace  a  considerable  share  of  quota-
generally  followed  the remedy  proposed  by  the  restricted imports in the United States.
WGIC's legal counsel. In  short, the industry  was  Prices for wheat gluten  will equalize  across
successful in obtaining what it sought.  the  NAFTA  region.  Differences  in  exchange
However,  whether  the  gluten  quota  will  rates  will help to determine trade flows  between
provide  much  long-term  economic  relief to  the  Canada  and  the  United  States.  Recent  strength-
U.S.  wheat gluten  industry  is  not apparent.  The  ening of the U.S.  dollar relative  to the  Canadian
two  primary  reasons  for this  conclusion  are the  dollar will  encourage  a greater share  of NAFTA
significant  excess  capacity  in  the  United  States  production  to be  in Canada.  Indeed,  because  of
and  the  potentially  significant  and  legal  in-  sticky  wages  and  fixed  costs,  a stronger  dollar
creases in Canadian imports.  could rationalize a condition in which U.S.  proc-
essors  face  accounting  losses,  while  Canadian
Excess Capacity in the United States  firms operate at full capacity  and earn profits.
The  U.S.  wheat  starch-gluten  industry  op-  USITC Impact Assessment
erated  at  44  percent  capacity  in  1997  (USITC,
1998a).  A  binding  quota  would  drive  a  wedge  Presuming that no illegal transshipments  of
between  the  U.S.  price  and  the  world  price.  gluten  arrive  in  the  United  States  through  ex-
However,  a binding  quota  also  would  create  an  cluded nations,  such as Mexico,  and that Canada
incentive  to  use  excess  capacity.  The  specific  does  not increase  imports  into the United  States,
price  that emerges  in  the United  States depends  the USITC  estimates that the quota initially  will
on  the demand  and  supply elasticity  in the  U.S.  raise  domestic  wheat  gluten  prices  to  between
gluten industry.  As discussed earlier,  demand  is  3.2  percent  and  8.3  percent  over  1997  levels
inelastic  (Ortalo-Magne  and  Goodwin,  1992).  (USITC,  1998b). U.S.  producers'  domestic sales
However, in an excess capacity  situation, supply  volume  would  increase  by  14  percent  to  19.8
is  most  assuredly  elastic.9 Therefore,  small  in-  percent,  and  sales  revenues  would  increase  by
creases  in  price  are  likely  to  cause  large  in-
creases in capacity utilization.  A significant sup-  'O  Canada uses tariff-rate  quota, which essentially limits all
ply response  to  the quota,  along  with  inelastic  countries  except  the United  States  and Mexico  to  123,557
metric  tons for  all  wheat  products  per crop year. The base
in-quota tariff is 17.5 percent and  is scheduled to be phased
down to  5.3  percent  as a part  of Canada's  WTO  commit-
9  The USITC (1998c) suggested a supply elasticity between  ments. Once the quota is met, however, the rate  increases to
2 and 5.  CDN$467/ton plus the current  17.5 percent tariff.Balzer, Brian, and Kyle Stiegert  The EU-U.S. Wheat Gluten Policy Dispute  9
20.8  percent  to  27  percent.  Domestic  capacity  U.S. wheat gluten firms in the long run? Canada and
utilization is expected  to increase from a level of  Mexico  are both exempt from the three-year quota.
44.5  percent  in  1997  to  between  50.7  percent  Canada recently has added considerable new capac-
and  53.3 percent with the implementation  of the  ity, and a weaker Canadian  dollar should encourage
three-year quota.  exports into the United  States. Also, the U.S.  indus-
Can  this  industry  be  profitable  when  only  try has significant excess capacity.
52  percent  of  its  capacity  is being  used  in  the  Future  research  on  the  wheat  gluten  trade
production  process?  This  is  hard  to  say,  given  dispute should consider several important  issues.
that  such  low  utilization  rates  are  uncommon.  First,  a  model  could  be  developed  to  test
Most  U.S.  industries  typically  operate  between  whether  U.S.  imports  of gluten  have  displaced
75  percent  and  95  percent  of capacity.  Also,  domestic  capacity,  which  was  suggested  by  the
U.S.  starch  and  ethanol  markets  have  a  role  in  anecdotal  evidence  presented  earlier.  Second,
determining profits in this industry.  The industry  EU policies  to encourage gluten production  may
has  been  developing  new value-added  products  be having  a  significant  effect  in reducing  wheat
from gluten  and  starch.  If it is successful  in  de-  protein  premiums  throughout  the  world.  If  so,
veloping  and  marketing  these  products,  profit-  research  should  be  developed  to  quantify  this
ability to  the industry  could improve  along with  effect.  Returns  to  breeding  programs,  elevators
utilization  rates,  even  if raw  starch  and  gluten  and  storage  businesses,  and  producer  incomes
prices remain depressed.  are all partly dependent on wheat protein premi-
ums. Third,  simulating the  spatial economics  of
Conclusion  the  NAFTA starch-gluten  market could  provide
many  stronger  insights  into  the  EU-U.S.  trade
World  prices  for  vital  wheat  gluten  have  dispute. This simulation  would have to consider
declined  significantly  in  the  past several  years.  the economic substitutability of wheat starch and
The WGIC  claimed that these price declines  are  cornstarch, spatial factors of transport costs from
due principally to EU policies  that have  encour-  the  various  U.S.  and  Canadian  plants,  and  ex-
aged  wheat  starch-gluten  production  and  ex-  change  rate  differentials  between  trading  na-
ports.  The  USITC  and  the  Clinton  administra-  tions,  and  also  should  include  the possible  im-
tion  supported  these industry  claims  and  placed  pacts  on  the  industry  associated  with  U.S.  and
a three-year quota on wheat gluten imports  with  Canadian ethanol policies.
specific  restrictions  on  EU  levels.  The  import  In  the final  analysis,  several  options  could
quota  will  be reviewed  further  for possible  ex-  be  pursued.  First,  the  U.S.  quota  could  be  ex-
tensions of up to five additional years.  tended  past the current three-year period. While
Considerable anecdotal  evidence  exists that  some short-term relief is possible from an exten-
the EU policies are indeed providing an artificial  sion, increased  plant capacity in Canada  and ex-
profit  incentive  for their  domestic  starch-gluten  cess  capacity  in  the  United States  will  work  to
industry.  During the  past  10 years,  firms  in the  limit increases  in wheat gluten prices.  A second
European Union have retrofitted corn-processing  option  is  to  pursue  negotiations  with  the  Euro-
plants  to  process  wheat;  they  have  expanded  pean  Union  to  correct perceived  problems  with
with new capacity;  and  they have operated  at or  their  agribusiness  policies.  While  the  potential
near full capacity most of the time. On the other  gains from removing  EU starch  subsidies  could
hand,  some  U.S.  plants  have  been  shut  down,  be  high,  the probability  of any  such  success  in
and others have operated  below  design capacity.  this  area  is  probably  quite  low.  Perhaps  some
Given the complex EU CAP structure and  these  joint agreements, which involve  other industries,
recent  events,  logic  dictates  that  EU  firms  that  are  possible,  but  it  is  simply  not  reasonable  to
process  wheat  to  gluten  and  starch  must be  re-  think  that  the  European  Union  will  easily  re-
ceiving  some preferential  policy  treatment  rela-  move long-entrenched policies that favor certain
tive to EU  cornstarch processors  and  relative to  political groups.
wheat processors  worldwide.  One  of the  reasons  that the WGIC  wanted  a
The  three-year  quota  was  approved  to  help  gluten quota was  to give the industry time  to de-
lessen  the  damage  caused  by  the  surge  in  wheat  velop  its  value-added  processing  sector.  Without
gluten  imports.  How  well  will  this  policy  protect  locally adequate supplies of starch and gluten from10  July1999  Journal  of Food Distribution  Research
wheat, such investments and product development  Ortalo-Magne,  F. and B.K. Goodwin.  1992.  "An  Economet-
would  be unlikely.  To this  end, we  think the  in-  ric Analysis of U.S.  Vital Wheat Gluten Imports."  Ag-
dustry's  success  will hinge on the effectiveness  of  ricultural  Economics. 7. Parcell,  J.L.  and  K.W.  Stiegert.  1998.  "Competition  for this plan. The gluten  quota may provide enough of  U.S.  Hard  Wheat  Characteristics."  Journal of Agri-
a  shield  for  the industry  to  limp forward  at  best.  cultural  and Resource Economics. 23:140-154.
With more value-added  options  available for these  Stiegert, K.W. and J.P.  Blanc. 1997.  "Japanese Demand  for
raw outputs,  the U.S.  wheat  starch-gluten  industry  Wheat  Protein Quantity and Quality."  Journal  of Ag- crawoutputd  g  ate  U.S.a  more  p  table  envirnment  ricultural  and Resource Economics. 22:104-119. could  generate  a  more  profitable  environment.  Tate and Lyle Annual Report, 1994.  1997.  Attachment  2, Without  success  in developing  value-added  prod-  Midwest Grain Pamphlet.
ucts  or  somehow  getting  the European  Union  to  USITC  (U.S.  International  Trade  Commission).  1998a.
restructure  its  policies,  consolidation  within  the  "Wheat  Gluten,  Staff  Report  to  the  Commission  on
industry  seems inevitaInvestigation  No.  TA-201-67,"  pp.  11-14,  11-22-24, industry seems  inevitable.  II-39.  9 January. 1I-39.9 January.
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